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Summary 
 
According to some terrorist fighters and academicians, the constituencies of Muslim extrem-
ists are vital to the persistence of the jihad. I have established that although sympathizers are 
indispensable for recruiting and sponsoring, they are less crucial for making foreign jour-
neys, generating revenues, and communication. This is not only so because sympathizers re-
fuse to help because of fear of retaliation, but also because it is unnecessary, impossible, or 
unfavorable for extremists to recourse to their constituencies. Therefore, sympathizers may 
be important for the persistence of the jihad, yet their role is not self-evident. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Several terrorist fighters are convinced that Muslim extremism cannot do without Islamic 
communities tacitly or openly approving of the violent jihad.1 Recently an employee of the 
German intelligence service expressed this view as a result of the arrest of fifteen extremists 
who would belong to a network that was concentrated in Ulm and Neu Ulm and that would 
have been occupied with recruiting, counterfeiting passports, and fundraising.2 According to 
him Muslim communities had withhold certain activities from the authorities and had even 
actively supported some of these activities. There are also academicians who emphasize the 
importance of sympathizers in relation to the violent jihad. For instance, Benjamin Barber, 
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author of ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’, remarked in an interview that: ‘The problem is not terrorists. 
There are only a few crazy terrorists. The problem is a large number of people who are not 
terrorists but who look the other way or support the terrorists’.3 Roberta Senechal de la Roche 
has argued that support of third parties is a necessary precondition of all kinds of terrorism, 
hence not only of violence committed in the name of jihad.4 Collective violence could not 
surpass the level of impulsive, incidental outbursts without this support of third parties. 
 These policy makers and academicians implicitly assume that intergroup struggle is a 
sufficient condition for group participation in violent conflict. According to Roger V. Gould 
most sociological explanations of group conflict are based on this presupposition. However, 
one can wonder whether that is justified in case of the jihad. After all, it is imaginable that 
sympathizers are backed down from actively supporting the preparation of the jihad because 
of fear of retribution. Especially in a time when Muslims run the risk of being considered a 
potential terrorist on the basis of a shared faith only, this fear could deter them from aiding 
extremists with the preparation of violence. 
Therefore the assumption that sympathizers are prepared to transform their support of 
the jihad into concrete aid might prove problematic. This raises the question whether the con-
stituencies of Muslim extremists really play an indispensable role in the preparation of the 
violence committed in name of the jihad. Moreover, if sympathizers do not play a decisive 
role in certain respects, is this because they are not prepared to transform their support of the 
jihad into action or are there other reasons responsible for this? The role of sympathizers was 
ascertained with respect to three preparatory activities that always precede terrorism, yet do 
not necessarily end up in it. The activities consist of nesting – placing extremists in countries 
of destination –, financing, and communication. The analysis was restricted to the activities 
of terrorist networks that have committed themselves to a global struggle between ‘pure’ 
Muslims and infidels and that are operational in Europe and North America. Networks that 
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had originally been committed to local political-religious conflicts in Arabic countries yet had 
subsequently become active in western countries for this global battle were counted among 
this category as well.5 Among the most important representatives of these global jihadist net-
works are Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), and the 
Takfir wal Hijra movement. 
Interviews and public publications like papers, (official) reports, newspaper articles, 
and scientific publications were used to answer the central questions.6 The interviews were 
held between Mai and July 2004 with eight professionals who had recently been involved in 
counterterrorism in the Netherlands.7 Respondents were asked open questions concerning 
Dutch criminal cases on the violent jihad they had been involved with directly or indirectly. 
The questions referred to how defendants had gained entrance to the Netherlands, how they 
managed to stay, how they generated income, and how they communicated. With respect to 
each of these strategies questions were posed on whether, and if so, how they resorted to gov-
ernmental agencies, kin, sympathizers, and criminal organizations.  
The next section deals with the theory on the role of constituencies in group conflict. 
The following section presents the data analysis. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
 
 
Solidarity and supporting terrorism 
 
Senchal de la Roche has founded her argument that sympathizers are vital for terrorism on 
Donald Black's ‘geometry of terrorism’ theory.8
Black conceives terrorism as a specific kind of social control; aimed at the correction 
of deviance. In case of terrorism social control would be carried out by way of ‘self-help’. He 
defines self-help as ‘the expression of a grievance by unilateral aggression’.9 Usually self-
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help is related to societies in which individuals depend on themselves in conflicts because the 
state has no monopoly on the execution of violence. However, according to Black, self-help 
is also present in areas were it is difficult for civilians to resort to the authorities. Terrorism 
would refer to a specific kind of self-help: ‘pure terrorism is self-help by organized civilians 
who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians’.10 In short, terrorism is about structural 
violence employed to more or less randomly chosen opponents by civilians who organize 
themselves in secret. This means that terrorism can be distinguished from smaller scale types 
of violence like feuding and from collective forms of violence with a more impulsive, inci-
dental, or overtly character like riots, lynchings, and vigilantism. 
Black states that terrorism can only occur when there exists a large social distance be-
tween an aggrieved group and a group that is blamed for it, while the physical distance be-
tween both groups is small.11 The social distance can cover different dimensions: cultural – 
for example with respect to differences in language, philosophy of life, and ethnicity; rela-
tional – for example the amount of mutual contacts, friendships, and marriages – and hierar-
chical – for example the differences in power and status. Social distance sets off a clear im-
age of an enemy and reduces the threshold to victimize as many random victims as possible 
among the enemy, while the physical vicinity offers the occasion to make these victims. 
According to Senechal de la Roche a large social distance between parties does indeed 
explain why conflicts are fought out violently instead of peacefully,12 but not why the vio-
lence is applied recurrently and well-organized instead of incidentally and unorganized.13 She 
ascribes latter to the social distance within and among third parties. Violence could only sur-
pass the incidental and unorganized character when third parties are involved in a conflict 
that are very partisan, in the sense that they clearly choose one side. There is question of 
‘strong partisanship’ when third parties support one party against the other and are solidary 
among themselves. Mutually solidarity especially occurs when the social distance between 
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parties is small, which means: participating actively in each other’s lives and being culturally 
homogenous and interdependent. Maximal partisanship occurs when all parties involved are 
polarized: two sides of homogeneous groups that are at great social distance of each other. 
Polarization generates a ‘gravitating’ force attracting newcomers indirectly to one of both 
sides. 
The violence committed in the name of the jihad is also recurrent and well-organized. 
The global list of insurgencies expands further everyday. These attacks are often preceded by 
long and profound preparations and involve extremists who contacted people in different 
countries. So, if Senechal de la Roche is right than third parties sympathizing with the jihad 
ought to play an indispensable role in the jihad. However, is this true? Are the constituencies 
of the jihad willing to actively support the preparation of insurgencies committed in the name 
of the jihad? 
As mentioned before, Roger V. Gould argues that sociological theories on collective 
violence like those of Black and Senechal de la Roche assume too easily that solidarity auto-
matically implies preparedness of individuals to actively contribute to collective violence.14 
However, sympathizers can also decide not to contribute on the basis of their awareness that 
they can be avenged for it personally: ‘Any confrontation between collections of people – 
whether the boundary dividing them is one of class, ethnicity, neighborhood, clan, race, gen-
der, or religion – involves the possibility that group action will not occur because behavior is 
dominated by individualistic motives’.15 His research on feuding in nineteenth century Cor-
sica has indeed ascertained two factors restricting the willingness of individuals to participate 
in collective violence on behalf of their reference group.  
First, conflicts stemming from group contention were less often resolved violently 
than conflicts originating from one-on-one contention because the antagonists took into ac-
count the possibility that the violence would escalate. After all, group contention implied that 
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opponents were part of a group that could be mobilized to strike back.16 Moreover, it oc-
curred that kin of the perpetrators were seldom victimized when they did not contribute to the 
violence themselves or helped to escape the culprit. According to Gould this meant that 
‘avengers did not randomly choose from the offender’s kin group, but rather targeted kin who 
declined to distance themselves from the offender or his action. Far from treating the solidar-
ity of the rival groups as given, then, vendettas of this sort were sanctions against solidarity.17 
This mechanism would deter individuals to manifest solidarity with their kin: ‘When retalia-
tion is conditional on demonstrations of solidarity, a potential aggressor is disciplined ex ante 
by the knowledge that drawing on allies will provoke retaliation by the victim’s allies, and an 
aggressor’s allies know ex post that they are not potential targets for retaliation as long as 
they have refrained from helping the others’.18
On the one hand Gould argues that his findings with respect to avenging on Corsica in 
the nineteenth century can not automatically be generalized to other historical and geographi-
cal contexts, but on the other hand he does not rule this out beforehand either. Indeed it is 
imaginable that both factors that deterred Corsicans from helping kin in case of conflicts, also 
restrain the constituencies of the jihad to support the preparation of terrorism. 
Muslim extremists fight powerful leaders in western and Arabic countries and choose 
their victims because of general characteristics ascribed to the enemy (e.g., nationality, relig-
ion, or ethnicity) rather than because of wrongful conduct by specific individuals. This ‘logic 
of collective liability’ entails that a large group considers itself a potential victim of the jihad 
and, consequently, perceives a common interest to fight it.19 The Establishment is motivated 
to take the initiative to counter the jihad because terrorism undermines their authority and be-
cause civilians hold the authorities responsible for the protection of their security. This means 
that sympathizers might fear the retaliation of a large group of powerful opponents when they 
actively support the preparation of the jihad. This can deter them from actually giving it. At 
 6
the same time it is difficult for counter terrorists to determine who belongs to the enemy. On 
Corsica solidarity was based primarily on kin relationships that were publicly known,20 while 
with respect to the jihad solidarity is based on shared faith that is much more difficult to ob-
jectify. As a result, Muslims can easily be accused falsely of contributing to the preparation 
of the jihad. This is more likely to happen, as the threat of insurgencies is perceived as more 
real. The awareness that the slightest hint can be enough to become a suspect of supporting 
the jihad can be yet another deterrent. 
In sum, it is imaginable that individual interests prevent sympathizers from playing 
the decisive role in the preparation of the jihad that is assumed by Senechal de la Roche’s 
theory on collective violence. In the next section we will analyze the role of sympathizers 
with respect to three preparatory activities: nesting, financing, and communication. 
 
 
Nesting 
 
Muslim extremists apply two strategies in order to nest in countries of destination. Their first 
strategy is to recruit people inside countries of destination. Their second one is to secure en-
trance to and residence in those countries. Combinations of both strategies also occur. This is 
so when recruiters or potential recruits attempt to get entrance to or stay in countries of desti-
nation. Both strategies will be discussed separately. 
 
Recruiting 
Extremists are being recruited in western countries. They often own the nationality of the 
country of destination. Therefore they attract less attention than insurgents that enter from 
Islamic countries or conflict areas do.21 Sympathy for violent goals does not have to be the 
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only or even main reason for new recruits to become active. Other possible reasons are the 
wish to belong to a group, to gain power and esteem, or to experience adventure and distrac-
tion.22 However, sympathy is of course an important breeding ground for recruitment. 
 Recruiters are often former jihadists.23 They enjoy standing among radicals because 
they have actively contributed to the holy war. Recruiting begins in Islamic centers, coffee 
shops, asylum seeker centers, salafist mosques, or prisons.24 Especially latter two locations 
are used as a starting point for recruitment. The chances are high that recruiters track poten-
tial recruits in salafist mosques25 because moderate Muslims deliberately evade them.26 Pris-
ons are a hot spot for other reasons. In there, recruiters have ample time to promote an alter-
native lifestyle to criminals who often feel rejected by society and who posses knowledge, 
contacts, and capabilities that can come in handy for the preparation and execution of at-
tacks.27
Especially radical Muslims who can easily be isolated from their social environment 
are receptive to recruitment. According to the AIVD this concerns three categories in particu-
lar.28 The first category consists of autochthonous westerners who converted to Islam. They 
are inclined to cut through all ties with people they were engaged with before their conver-
sion while they are not yet deeply embedded in the Islamic community.29 The second cate-
gory consists of radical Muslims who have recently immigrated. They are usually single men 
who have abandoned their families in their country of origin. Their contacts with the country 
of origin have weakened, while they have not yet established a broad social network in the 
country of residence. The so-called Hamburg cell, that has played a lead role in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, is illustrative of this category. This cell consisted of a group of foreign stu-
dents that had gradually discontinued contacts with their families in their countries of ori-
gin.30 The last category consists of young second or third generation migrants originating 
from North Africa. They maintain fewer ties with the country of origin than their parents do, 
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while their contacts with the autochthonous population are often limited. They are especially 
likely to become potential recruits when they are marginalized even further after a crisis like 
an addiction, a detention, or the death of a significant other.31 For example, former profes-
sional football player Nizar Trabelsi was an alcoholic and a drug addict before he became in-
volved in the preparation of an attack on the American Embassy in Paris or an American 
army basis in Belgium,32 and the process of radicalization of Mohammed B, the suspected 
assassin of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, is supposed to have accelerated after the death 
of his mother.33
 Recruiters attempt to isolate potential jihadists further by persuading them to visit pri-
vate assemblies in places like living rooms. In there they communally pray and watch videos 
of radical imams, insurgencies, and Muslims victims of violence. In addition they visit 
propagandistic websites and chat groups. Subsequently, they are prepared for the holy war by 
making religious educational trips and visiting training camps. For example, in the Nether-
lands the convict Radoin Daoud housed illegal Muslims, organized radical sermons, showed 
jihadist videos, and made cassette tapes of people exalting to be prepared to die as a martyr. 
He bonded with these illegal immigrants by providing them identity papers (interview). 
In short, sympathizers are indeed essential for successful recruitment for the violent 
jihad. They are particularly inclined to focus increasingly on the violent jihad and to avoid 
presumed dissenters as much as possible. Radical imams and sheiks that encourage the vio-
lent jihad contribute to this radicalization process. 
 
Entrance and residence 
Extremists who exclusively operate in their own country are certainly not the only ones who 
are involved in the violent jihad. This kind of terrorism is a transnational phenomenon par 
excellence.34 Al-Qaeda has had a safe haven in Afghanistan between 1997 and 2001 when the 
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Taliban ruled this country. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies at 
least twenty thousand recruits from all parts of the world have been trained in camps in Af-
ghanistan.35 Subsequently, these recruits have participated in battles in countries like Bosnia, 
Chechnya, and Iraq or they have returned to their countries of origin. Extremists have also 
left countries in order to follow a religious education in a Koran school, madrassa, or to visit 
radical imams in mosques. Furthermore, some have intermediated between terrorist cells in 
different countries. Transnationalism requires of Muslim extremists to manage the entrance to 
and residence in other countries. This unavoidably brings them into contact with the authori-
ties that are responsible for the admittance, policing, and extradition of aliens. 
Extremists can avoid contacts with state agencies entirely by immigrating illegally. 
Extremists who domiciled illegally have indeed been arrested in different countries. Addi-
tionally, there are indications that militant Muslims have been brought into countries with the 
help of smugglers from countries like Albania, Turkey, and Latin America.36 However, ille-
gal immigration and residence have clear disadvantages for extremists. First, they make them 
dependent on family, friends, and co-religionists because without legal residence permit it is 
difficult to approach official agencies for work, housing, medical care, or social benefits. 
Second, illegal immigrants who help with the preparation of terrorist activities can be incar-
cerated and extradited because of their illegal status alone. 
Extremists can also enter a country legally and try to obtain a legal residence permit. 
Hundreds are known to have succeeded in this.37 Several insurgents of assaults in the United 
States and in Europe have acquired a tourist, student or business visa, while others have ob-
tained a legal residence permit because they married a wife with the nationality of the country 
of destination. Still others have been granted political asylum, sometimes after several appli-
cations under different names. However, there is little evidence that they have ever received 
help from sympathizing officials to obtain legal residence permits.38 Active assistance of cor-
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rupt officials is hard to organize in practice, let alone to maintain a large scale fraud over a 
longer period. Therefore, extremists usually have no alternative but to try to deceive officials. 
 Muslim extremists need passports and identity papers in order to hoax officials. They 
can steal these documents, buy them from persons who declare theirs missing, or fabricate 
them.39 Especially blank passports and visa that contain a legitimate registration number but 
no personal information are popular40 because no information has to be removed from them.41 
Another advantage is that the chance to be arrested with such documents is negligible. Inter-
pol disposes of a database consisting of almost two million missing passports yet the database 
is consulted in just a few countries.42 Furthermore, passports from visa-free countries are at-
tractive to jihadists.43 Travelers with such passports are temporarily allowed to reside in a 
country provided they own a return ticket.44 In the meanwhile the United States have tight-
ened the rules of the visa-waiver-program for the majority of the countries of the European 
Union without abolishing it altogether.45
 In short: extremists can hardly recourse to sympathizers for international migration. 
Latter can help to hide illegal immigrants and to counterfeit documents, but they are of lim-
ited use for obtaining residence permits. Active assistance of corrupt officials is hard to or-
ganize in practice. This means that extremists are forced to deceive officials in order to obtain 
residence permits. 
 
 
Financing 
 
Islamist networks need money to survive and to execute their activities. They use two strate-
gies to get the necessary financial means. Either they look for sponsors or they generate reve-
nues themselves.46 Both strategies will be discussed separately. 
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 Sponsoring 
Sponsors can be states or organizations. Countries that have been suspected of supporting the 
violent jihad financially are usually ruled by an elite of which at least a section sympathizes 
with the violent jihad. This applies to countries like Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Su-
dan.47
 Terrorists misuse the so-called zakat – one of the five religious duties of every Mus-
lim – in order to receive sponsorship of organizations. Zakat is the obligation to donate a 
share of one’s own resources to the needy. Radical imams have been arrested for passing on 
charity money raised in mosques to terrorist organizations48 and radical believers have co-
erced moderate imams to hand over such money.49 Furthermore, the assets of branches of 
foundations like Al Aqsa, Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), Al Haramain en Mu-
waffaq have been frozen because they supplied money to terrorist organizations.50 Sometimes 
this happened because of extremists that had infiltrated a legitimate foundation and some-
times it happened with the approval of the executive committee.51
 So, extremists can profit from zakat without the knowledge of the donors. Extremists 
also profit unobvious from the habits of Muslims and migrants in order to transfer money. 
Militant Muslims employ hawala to do this.52 There are clear indications that rich Arabs have 
transferred money to Al-Qaeda thru the hawala system.53 Hawala is used to transfer money 
from one party to the next outside the official financial circuit.54 It is founded on the mutual 
trust that all parties concerned will repay their debts.55 It appeals to Islamic terrorists since it 
leaves few traces and does not stand out because millions of migrants use it. However, this 
does not mean that hawala bankers do not keep accounts at all.56  
 Furthermore, Muslim extremists resort to money transfer services of businesses like 
Western Union.57 For example, the hijackers of the September 11 attacks received 20.000 
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dollar thru this company. As is true for hawala, money transferring is especially popular 
among migrants for providing and receiving cash money because it is also possible in coun-
tries where not everybody has a bank number.58 After it became known that this form of 
money transferring was also used for terrorist purposes, Western Union was compelled in the 
United States to pass on information on transfers to enforcement agencies. Nowadays, the 
agents of Western Union are perceived to be a larger risk with respect to financing terrorism 
than the customers. For this company screens these, mostly foreign, agents only marginally.59
 In short, Muslim extremists can recourse to sponsors who sympathize with the violent 
jihad. Besides, they resort to third parties who are secretly used by extremists. Latter parties 
concern Muslims who stick to the religious duty of zakat and immigrants who use hawala 
bankers or money transfer companies. Extremists exploit them because they are familiar with 
their habits. So, extremists profit from these Muslims and immigrants without their knowl-
edge or consent. 
 
Generating revenues 
Sponsorship does certainly not cover all expenses of extremists. Only some recruiters are re-
leased from generating revenues, and occasionally elite Al-Qaeda members have provided 
‘seed money’ to cells that enabled them to execute part of their plans. In general, extremists 
have to manage themselves financially largely.60 Consequently, certain individuals and cells 
are occupied predominantly or even entirely with acquiring revenues for the jihad. For this, 
they do not receive active support of sympathizers. 
Extremists have yielded revenues by undertaking licit and illicit enterprises. Al-Qaeda 
has owned retail, transport, and industrial businesses that were not only used as a storefront to 
launder money and transport weapons but also as an independent income source. In this case 
they can resort to ignorant consumers. Furthermore, there are indications that jihadist groups 
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have made alliances with organized crime in ‘failed states’. These states officially repudiate 
unlawful practices yet are unable to withstand them. For example, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and 
Hamas would have been engaged in drug trade, human smuggling, and counterfeiting of 
American dollars, audiovisual material, perfumes, and brand clothing in the border area be-
tween Argentine, Brazil, and Paraguay.61 Furthermore, Al-Qaeda would have operated in 
diamond smuggle in western Africa.62 However, the 9/11 Commission Report states that 
there is no hard evidence that Al-Qaeda has earned money with drug or diamond trade.63
 Other cells have engaged in criminality themselves. The explosives that were used for 
the train bombings in Madrid were traded for XTC and soft drugs, for example. The ‘gang of 
Roubaix’ has robbed in order to finance a bombing during the G-7 in Lille according to the 
French public prosecutor.64 In England a gang has furnished the jihad with large sums of 
money through a large banking scam combined with shoplifting. The gang members bought 
clothes and electronics with bank checks that were based on fraudulent bank numbers and 
swapped these goods for cash before it became clear that the bank checks were not covered.65 
In the Netherlands supporters of the Takfir Wal Hijra movement have been arrested and con-
victed for robbing, pick-pocketing, trade in counterfeited brand clothing, credit card fraud, 
drug trade, and telecom fraud (interview).66
 Much of the criminality is multifunctional. For instance, criminality does not only 
help to finance terrorism but also victimizes the enemy.67 In other words, criminality enables 
extremists to proceed their battle with other means than violence. Additionally, the trade in 
false documents does not only bring forth resources but also enables militant Muslims to hide 
their identity.68 In the Netherlands suspects have been arrested who had used several identity 
documents at the same time. This enabled them to conceal that they had encountered the po-
lice previously (interview). Likewise, counterfeited identity papers have been used to obtain 
social security numbers. A Dutch investigation brought to light, for example, that several 
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suspects of facilitating terrorism had applied for a social security number with the help of 
counterfeited French identity cards (interview). Telecom fraud is also multi-functional be-
cause it generates both revenues and communication means. Fencing stolen cell phones and 
telephone cards, not paying off phone bills, hacking telephone centers, and selling hacked in-
formation to phone shops are different kinds of telecom fraud.69
In short, the role of sympathizers is limited with respect to generating revenues. First, 
extremists are forced to resort to other parties like consumers and criminal organizations be-
cause the donations of sponsors fall short. Second, criminality offers the possibility to victim-
ize the enemy by other means than violence. So, resorting to others than sympathizers can at 
the same time present a necessity and an opportunity to extremists.  
 
Communication 
 
Muslim extremists resort to all sorts of communication means for their activities: couriers, 
letters, cell phones and satellite telephones, short wave transmitters, e-mails, chat groups, and 
websites. Usually they shut out the social environment anxiously in order to keep their plans 
secretly. They cut themselves off the outside world, for instance, by arranging face-to-face 
meetings, sending encrypted messages, using voice over the Internet, or telephoning by 
means of ‘easy room’ telephone cards which could be bought and filled up from all over the 
world and which have been removed by now.70 However, extremists do use the social envi-
ronment in order to mingle unobvious among a larger public. In this case it is irrelevant 
whether the public sympathizes with the jihad. 
 For example, some of the September 11 insurgents have used public libraries,71 other 
Al-Qaeda members have resorted to Internet cafés,72 and Dutch convicts mostly called from 
telephone boots (interview). Phone shops also play an important role in the preparation of ter-
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rorism (interview).73 For example, five people have been arrested in the Dutch town 
Schiedam for using a phone shop for conspiring and stocking chemical ingredients of explo-
sives.74 In September 2003 the United States have requested the Dutch government to extra-
dite three persons who had contacted an American suspect of connections with Bin Laden in 
a phone shop using false telephone cards.75
 Phone shops provide facilities to phone and use the Internet. Usually these shops spe-
cialize in these services but sometimes laundries, barbershops or Islamic butchers exploit one 
or two telephone lines in their businesses. Most customers of phone shops are migrants who 
want to contact their relatives abroad. Hawala bankers also like to operate from phone shops 
because of this concentration of migrants.76 Both the background of the clientele and the 
presence of hawala bankers attract Muslim extremists to phone shops. In there they can 
communicate with foreign contacts unobvious because the majority of the customers use 
phone shops for this reason too and they can recourse to hawala banker to transfer money. 
 The Internet offers jihadists another possibility to operate unobvious. In this case 
sympathizers do play a significant role. The Internet contains countless chat groups, web 
sites, web logs, and news groups concerning the Islam that are chiefly visited by Muslims.77 
Many of them perceive the Internet as a concrete manifestation of a global Muslim commu-
nity, ummah.78 Radical Muslims who promote the jihad also mingle in these Internet envi-
ronments.79 Muslims use these sites for recruiting, conspiring, and fundraising.80 Potential 
recruits who have been spotted in chat rooms receive surveys and are tested on- and off-line 
before recruiters decide whether they will be accepted as new members.81
 The Internet also plays an increasingly important role in the training and education of 
new recruits since the destruction of the training camps in Afghanistan.82 The Internet con-
tains elaborate instruction manuals on abduction, guerilla tactics in cities, and military battle 
techniques for jihadists,83 and a film has been posted on a site that explains stepwise how to 
 16
explode bombs with the help of cell phones, just as the commuter train bombings in Madrid 
were committed.84 The Internet is also used for religious education. Saudi Arabic mullahs 
have provided Dutch radical Muslims with advice, for example.85
 The Internet is an attractive medium to extremists because it enables them to commu-
nicate with people all over the world anonymously. They can conceal and change their iden-
tity by ditching old e-mail addresses and creating new ones86 and by stealing unguarded 
server space.87 Jumping virtually from one computer to the next offers a possibility to conceal 
their physical location. Anonymity can also easily be preserved because hosting companies 
hardly check the minimal information they demand from their customers.88
In short, militant Muslims use their social environment to mingle unobvious among an 
ignorant larger public that usually does not consist of sympathizers. Extremists move into 
public establishments like libraries, cyber cafés, phone shops, and the virtual ummah. The 
popularity of latter two locations shows that extremists prefer to immerge in a larger crowd 
that is dominated by migrants or Muslims. Just as we have seen with respect to financing it is 
true that Muslim extremists often profit from their habits independent of their views on the 
violent jihad. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have looked into the role of the constituencies of Muslim extremists with respect to the 
preparation of the violent jihad. It occurred that they play an essential role in certain aspects. 
Sympathizers perform as sponsors, potential recruits, or propagandists of the violent jihad. 
However, extremists also recourse to migrants and Muslims who share several habits yet are 
completely unaware of the intentions of extremists. For example, they secretly use hawala 
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bankers to transfer money, human smugglers to cross borders, and the Islamic ‘online com-
munity’ to communicate. They also misuse the religious duty of Muslims to donate a share of 
their resources to the needy. Extremists also resort to non-Muslims. They appeal to immigra-
tion officers and steal personal documents from non-Muslims. They also use non-Muslims as 
consumer or make them a target of criminality. 
Thus, backup of constituencies does not play an essential role in all aspects of the 
preparation of the jihad. We found three reasons for this; it can be unnecessary, impossible, 
or unfavorable. First, extremists often do not need sympathy in order to reach their goals. Ex-
tremists secretly use Muslims and migrants as a cover and as a possibility to recourse to tradi-
tions and habits that are familiar to them. Resorting to their constituencies would create un-
necessary risks. Second, in some facets extremists are unable to obtain support of their con-
stituencies. This is so when sympathizers lack the means, knowledge, and opportunities 
needed to prepare and execute insurgencies. For instance, it is very difficult to find sympa-
thizers who are able to provide residence permits. In this case extremists are forced to rely on 
other parties. Finally, in some facets resorting to sympathizers is unfavorable. This can either 
be for offensive or defensive reasons. An offensive reason applies when extremists want to 
continue the holy war with other means than violence by resorting to the enemy instead of 
sympathizers. For example, criminality not only brings in revenues but also victimizes the 
enemy. A defensive reason for not recoursing to sympathizers is to avoid suspicion. Some 
extremists have behaved like westerners or have married non-Islamic women because they 
want to go unnoticed.89 For this reason mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed commanded 
the hijackers of the September 11 attacks to avoid the Muslim community in the United 
States as much as possible.90
Do the findings of present study support the terrorist fighters and scholars who assign 
a crucial role to constituencies with respect to the violent jihad? Not entirely. The analysis 
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demonstrated that sympathizers are indispensable to some preparative terrorist activities, yet 
not to other. Extremists depend less on their constituencies for making foreign journeys, gen-
erating revenues, and communication then they do for recruiting and sponsoring. The practi-
cal implication of this conclusion is that pushing back partisanship does not automatically re-
sult in the receding of the violent jihad. Do the findings support Gould’s thesis that personal 
interests can prevent constituencies from participating in collective violence? No, but this 
might be true anyway. This study did not establish how often and under what conditions 
sympathizers refused to give help because of fear of retaliation. However, it demonstrated 
that fear of retaliation is not the only reason why sympathizers do not play a decisive role in 
all facets of the preparation of the jihad. Sometimes terrorists were responsible for this rather 
than sympathizers. Muslim extremists sometimes choose not to resort to their constituencies 
because of strategic reasons. They attempt to avoid taking unnecessary risks or to hit their 
enemies by other means than violence. 
 Therefore, although sympathizers may be important for the continuation of the jihad, 
their role is not self-evident. This is not only so because sympathizers might fear retaliation 
for helping Muslim extremists, but also because extremists do not always allow them to help. 
This conclusion asks for a refinement of the assumption that Muslim extremism cannot do 
without their constituencies. 
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